

MIHAIL MANOILESCU, "THE VIENNA DICTAT"

A Wretched Political Situation Inducing a Fatal Command

• A Few Notes •

Prof. Dan Popescu

"One sitting outwardly cannot judge inwardly"

Vasile Pârvan

- 1940, a summer of horrors: Romania torn apart by Germany, Russia, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria
- the greatest Romanian economist's examination of the time wraths, preliminaries and the document itself

(I)

Recently, the volume of the greatest Romanian, European, universal economist Mihail Manoilescu, a Minister of the External in Gigurtu Government, was released. The work is entitled "The Vienna Dictat", Paul Editions. The document produced immense writing on it, a command imposed to the Romania of the time – the greatest two powers that were making the law in Europe and in the world, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia (USSR) that were in their "honeymoons" after the famous "Ribbentrop-Molotov" pact. It is right, about the Soviet Union which had cut a few months before – at Hitler's accept and stimulation – a part of Romania – Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina – a little less was written after August 23, 1944 and up to 1960; then another kind of examination started.

Similarly, less was written about Bulgaria's request on the Cadrilater. Nevertheless, about Germany and Italy, answering Hungary's wishes to annex and succeeding in it with a vengeance, we have considerable writings. Not few times, however, without pertinent, judicial, necessary analyses, replacing the "C" from dictat with "K" in order to give it the necessary connotation of this terrible document imposed by Germany, Italy, Hungary, Russia; anyway, had it

not been for Germany and USSR “in our back”, with an overwhelming military potential, Romania would have had problems neither with Hungary, nor with Bulgaria. After 1989, however, the sphere of nuances yet being enriched, it similarly continued and not once.

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1. Now, nevertheless, we have to deal with a work of another weight, a volume of another Romanian economist, so well-known abroad – and who knew how to analyse, starting from the irreducible relation request-offer, projected on many and diverse plans; a volume of the one who found himself, starting even with the end of 1920s in the very close circle of Carol II, knowing, thus, many of the “secrets of gods”; a volume of the one who was widely praised by academic, economic and very often political circles of Germany, Italy, then, Spain, Portugal etc.; a work signed by the one who, less than two months before, had been called as a result of his great prestige and his bright intelligence, by King Carol II, to be part of the new government (Gigurtu), formed after Tătăreanu’s, as Minister of the External; Rex, relying on Manoilescu’s amazing personality and hoping, thus to “save one thing or another”, certainly, referring to his throne; behold, a few professional traits of the one signing the above-mentioned volume.

We do not have the necessary space to refer to the multitude of problems approached in this work. We will refer, now, especially, to the examination that Mihail Manoilescu makes to the wraths of time and thus to Romania’s position, to the politically diplomatic preliminaries of the Dictat (we are going to use Mihail Manoilescu’s graphic signs for Diktat) of August 30, 1940. Everything, in the opinion of the great Romanian economist, sociologist and politologist, took place in a logical succession of events developed starting with the beginning of 1930s up to the unlucky mentioned date, a succession which later continued, one could not “change the course”. Let us try to make out Manoilescu’s writing intimacies and comment on him as such.

Not few authors of volumes and studies approached The Dictat from Vienna either in an academic manner, even too academic, or in a superficial “close-to-the-subject” one of some political analysts and “finer” politologists, either in a literary manner or in a journalistic one, or having something in common with all this. This was not harmful and they contributed, in one way or

another, to finding the truth about this arbitrary act. I, nevertheless, give confidence, total trust to Mihail Manoilescu. I “know” him well from his bright economic books and studies, I know his attentive and profound manner of thinking, his manner to conceive and finish mathematically, very often implying engineering skills etc., and then, as compared to many others, he was always there, offering the model of a skilled politician. More than two decades, this great scientist and patriot taken into consideration in a great manner, found himself at the centre of events. He knew how to overcome them and, more especially, how to interpret them.

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2. Towards the end of the 1930s, something before and after the start of World War II, as said by Manoilescu, “the external problematics was dominated by the extraordinary importance that the Axis powers, Germany and Italy, got”. It is certain that the Soviet Union was insistently pursuing to regulate “its problem” – according to its thinking – the problem of Bessarabia adding Northern Bucovina. And it had “regulated” it since May 1940 by threatening with force and invasion. The treaties, another support elements for Romania, had died. In this sense, Grigore Gafencu, quoted by Manoilescu, shows us that after the burst, in September 1939, of the war which was to become world war, “the guarantees” given by Great Britain (and France) on the security of Romanian borders were not valid any more, especially in front of USSR. When, in July 1940, Hitler received the new Romanian Minister in Berlin, he said to him directly that “Romania’s suffering of the time is the result of the wrong politics of having received those guarantees”. It was a German judgement. From one side, at the beginning USSR’s, and then from another, Lord Lloyd had declared, some time ago, to the British government that “he is afraid to interpret “a la lettre” the engagements it made (the British Government)”... “the English guarantees against USSR could reinforce the solidarity between Moscow and Berlin. He begged, in conclusion, the Romanian government not to raise this problem, of British guarantees and their spread because the British government is not in the measure to give public explanations on the subject”. Gafencu, once again quoted by Manoilescu, would complete that “such a measure did not have another purpose than that of...avoiding ill-timed explanations which could irritate the Soviet Union”. “The conciliators”, of one kind or another, would say, further

on, their word. With France, things were even clearer: after “la drolle de guerre”, the Hexagon was directing rapidly towards its great crush. Germany supported USSR in its requests and vice-verse, in the hope, that both powers, above-mentioned, would not start, at least immediately, one against the other. Manoilescu would show that the treaty was to be paid with a tragedy in which small countries were dragged. First Austria, then Czechoslovakia, then Poland... and, behold, there also came, in some way or another, Romania’s turn. We were directly without support and, to a great extent, without direction.

...Mihail Manoilescu examines the origin of Germany’s and Italy’s hostilities towards us by evaluating the past taken over by Gigurtu Government and by him as Minister of the External. “Germany and Italy were not our friends.” “This was the inheritance I was receiving as Minister of the External”. Starting with Italy, as this great economist and politician continues, I remind you that in the period 1926-1927 General Averescu had had an excellent external politics (also see M.M’s “Memories”, A/N) managing to obtain Bessarabia’s recognition, without, at the same time, indisposing France... “Under Titulescu’s influence, the Treaty concluded by Averescu between Italy and Romania was left to fall... But our great enmity was with Italy from 1935, from the time of the sanctions, when we were the first State in the world to put the sanctions against Italy in force, while the Hungarian, who were helped so much by the Nations’ Society that they even received a loan from there, refused to apply sanctions asking Italy to give an exceptional title of gratitude”. Manoilescu also evokes what happened in the Nations’ Society in 1936, when “Titulescu asked for the firing of the Italian newspaper journalists with the words “Chassez-moi ces barbares”... These words have deeply penetrated in the Italian popular masses...”. It was all about the bloody politics of Italian colonialists in Africa, in Abyssinia. Titulescu was right, but the reverso of the medal, Mussolini’s Italy, reacting later on the same, was as in the case of Romania, Count Ciano stimulating as much as he could the Vienna Dictat. Latins they were, but when their interests came about...

Nevertheless, we wonder why Germany was so determined and interested to answer without reserve to anomalous requirements, lacking any nationally-demographic and historical criteria during Horthy’s Hungary. It is Manoilescu who explains. He depicts (examines, A/N) from our relations with them (Germany) a few moments that could be decisive”. Before rendering them here, let us not forget Romania’s harsh, difficult, bloody fight against Germany – Central Powers during the First World War, let us not forget the rivers of blood

and the dead that were still separating us; similarly, of the occupied territories and the loco populations by the German militaries, cynical and inflexible towards the immense physical, material sufferings of the native people. Among others, in full winter, they requisitioned not just the last nutriments of Romanian citizens but also their blankets, pillows, wood, dishes, seizing even church bells ... this is not to be easily forgotten, neither by the Romanians, nor by the Germans who, knowing what they had done in Romania, would have germs of distrust in the country and its people, outspokenly sympathising historically with France at first, but also with Great Britain. King Carol II, on the other hand, had pushed, in his turn, Romania on this road.



3. Coming back to Mihail Manoilescu, the Romanian scholar underlines an initial attitude with some of Germany's favourability towards Romania. Behold, in November 16, 1936, Hitler states in the presence of George Brătianu – found in Germany on a visit – that “if Romania's politics freed itself from the soviet influence and concluded better economic relations with Germany, Romania would receive, like Yugoslavia, Germany's insurance against revisionist claims”. Hitler would also state, as Manoilescu writes: “I would go very far, given this case, and I would say this publicly and officially in Rome and Budapest, especially in Budapest”. Hitler authorized Brătianu, as Manoilescu mentions, to communicate to the king and the people in authority in Romania these statements. Obviously, Germany “had plans” and such points of view were being exposed just in their favour, in their support. Such plans were based on petrol, especially, but also on the Romanian cereals, riches so necessary, in war situations. Almost at the same date, Alfred Rosenberg published an article in the official Nazi newspaper “*Volkischer Beobachter*”, against Hungarian revisionism. In the article it is written “...of some wishes to fantastically revision, which are some totally strange attitudes from any reality... they, the Germans are not disposed to be the apostles of liberation for anyone...”, or, to all these “advances” of the Germans, Mihail Manoilescu says, “Bucharest would give no answer”. This was right, but this did not even, by far, mean that Romania was Germany's enemy.

Therefore, the author of the volume in discussion shows: “Göring, in December 4, 1936, at Hitler's order, communicates to Comnen, our minister in

Berlin that “we offer our friendship. If you refuse, we would look for friends some place else, and you should not wonder if we strengthen our relations with Hungary and Bulgaria”. While we were ignoring all these suggestions, Manoilescu reaffirms it, “the Hungarians would continue their ingenious politics of cultivating Germany, which was not impeding them, on the other hand to cultivate at the same time the English and the French...”

A “second argument in our relations with Germany” as written by Manoilescu, “was in March 1939 when we asked and obtained English-French guarantees for the respecting of Romanian borders. Such guarantees, as showed, were nevertheless not valid because the guaranteeing powers had been for a short period – and continued to be when they were given – beyond any possibility of being kept by any means. And the researcher continues to have other numerous arguments. Behold, “another cause of offence from the part of the Germans is the fact that one of Göring’s personal letters to King Carol II, from March 1940, was left without reply!... In the end – but not at all unimportant, A/N, - the Germans had found out from the documents they captured during the conquering of France, in June 1940, that Prime-Minister Tătărescu had concluded an agreement with England and France for the destroying (in need, A/N) of Romanian oil exploitation and for the ensuring of a corresponding financial compensation from the part of the two Powers”. It was, in conclusion, more secure to have the vigil eye of Germany – and Hungary, very close to it – to jump and intervene when it had to, from the peaks of the Carpathians, and not from Tisza, a little further ahead. We had, therefore, in 1940, “both the Italians and the Germans extremely hostile to Romania and ... they could invoke – rightly or wrongly – so many deeds that could justify their hostility”.

Why were there important, within this framework, the nationally-demographic criteria, the historical criteria, the evolutionary truths invoked by Romania against Hungary’s territorial rapt, heavily supported by Germany, for a great part in Transylvania? Why were the old maps important, even the Germans’, so truthfully drawn, with which Mihail Manoilescu and Valer Pop, Romanian delegates, had presented themselves, before, at the meeting with Hitler in Berlin (Manoilescu and Gigurtu) and then, in Vienna, on August 29-30, 1940? Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler’s “cherished” partner, from the German-Soviet pact, had already lied the stakes. Everything had been drawn in the

smallest detail. Romania found itself, excluding treaties, negotiations, alternatives, in front of a Dictat exercised with severe, blood-thirsty threats by the above-mentioned powers. The direct beneficiary was Hungary.

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4. Returning in time, we need to state a few facts. Just in the sense of those presented. A treaty of strong economic partnership with Germany, trying, on this line, also the throwing in with the new international order dictated by Germany, was concluded by Tătărescu Government, against all Romania's "French-British sympathies". The King, often used to try an approach towards Germany, when it hoped to outrun, in this way, Codreanu's iron-guardists and afterwards, Horia Sima's. Mrs. Lupescu, he did not want to separate himself from – some used to say that he couldn't, given his physical and psychological construction – and her entire circle of political and financial influence was yet "Achille's heel" for him, a Jew woman with power in the high circles of Romania, when Germany and Italy were leading a net politics, consistently antisemitic etc. Nevertheless, it was not enough. There was someone to pray when, in fact, we were firmly imposed what to do. Germany was forcing us to start discussions with USSR as to why would Romania lower the colours for Bessarabia, to which Northern Bucovina was added. In the night of June 26, 1940, "the Molotov Note" arrives, asking us to immediately give up the two territories. Being "advised", in consequence, by Germany, we ceded them without fight, so much the better as the Romanian army heads stated we are not prepared, that a war with USSR is going to be a real catastrophe.

Given such conditions, Mihail Manoilescu observes, after the loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, "the action of approaching (Germany, A/N) from Tătărescu government becomes... very accelerated"... "before and during the Bessarabian crisis, the Axis powers engaged both towards Hungary and towards Bulgaria, to support their claims against Romania...". At a meeting in Venice between Count Ciano and the Hungarian Ministry of the External Csaky, the latter authorized the Italian Minister to state that "in case that, without fight, Romania would give up Bessarabia to Russia and Dobrogea to Bulgaria, Hungary will step in and claim Transylvania". This was, however, a much older claim, from 1918. "From this so important circumstance, Manoilescu writes, it could be seen that the next day after Romania had ceded Bessarabia to Soviet

Russia without fight, Transylvania was, too, virtually lost, because the Hungarians could claim it even within the framework of the agreement they had made with the Axis powers". They "were counting on the fact that, during the Bessarabian crisis, they had not been calmed down (why Russia, and we not, A/N) by Berlin and Rome, only with empty words, but with precise promises". At the same time, "Germany's and Italy's Ministers, until then, reserved, would qualify now the Bulgarian brows (on the Cadrlater, A/N) as modest and easy to satisfy... there clearly results that Romania's destroying had started before July 4 (the date when Gigurtu Government was installed with Manoilescu as Minister of the External) and that its future was in debt. Those who were then the masters of Europe had promised (starting from their own interests, A/N), to our neighbours, pieces of Romania and the body of the country (without support, A/N) was lying down on the surgery table".

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5. "...The king was approaching Hitler asking him to temper the brows of Romania's neighbours in order to avoid the war in the Balcans", Manoilescu would write, given the conditions that each part knew what this was about: Romania did not fear Hungary and Bulgaria but Germany and USSR. In fact, "on July 2, 1940, in the Hungarian Chamber, there took place a manifestation in which the deputies, standing up, praised Hitler and Mussolini, vehemently crying also "Transylvania back!" Deputy Horvath shows, in the Chamber applause, that the Romanian State's tearing apart is a matter of days". Not just Trianon died, but also history and justice.

Certainly, the Germans would have appreciated the iron-guardists', their "fifth column" coming to power, would have enlightened them faster, easier, in all their intentions. Carol II, for the above-mentioned reasons, was despised by Hitler, by the Nazis. Therefore, the King preferred Gigurtu as Prime Minister. Manoilescu writes: "The Gigurtu Government was not a pleasant surprise for Germany, because we were not the ones wanted, expected at that time by the Germans." We were not, according to the simplistic judgment of some, "people driven by personal motives and the desire to make a career by relying on our supposed credit in Germany and Italy." No way. "As we found out, the Germans had been preparing their solution for Romania since June, and the establishment of the Gigurtu government was a setback ... a blow given by Carol

to remove the solution prepared by the Germans.” Mihail Manoilescu also writes: “The Germans never need whole people to see everything through the eyes of their country ... It had been established that the future government would consist of Antonescu and iron-guardists ...

We were considered undesirable by the Germans.” Had it been their government, the territorial raptures, as we have shown, would have taken place with greater intensity. We, however, had to preserve the national being of the Romanian state, the army, the institutions, the school, the church. Manoilescu also writes: “We must not have illusions. War losers are subject to certain laws. The losers in politics (as was Romania, which had been in permanent hostility to the then triumphant Axis) similarly. Good negotiators can alleviate difficult situations, but they cannot change them ...” “... Let's save as much of Transylvania as possible, without letting the Romanian state collapse, thanks to which - and through the firm will of the Transylvanians - Transylvania had become to be integrated and also thanks to which he later came to be reintegrated in Romania”. It was then about huge decisions but which had to be taken quickly. Certainly, as shown by Manoilescu, we will fight to the last man, it was heroic, and I believed in that, too, but war on three fronts - German, Russian, Hungarian - was not very possible. We would have been destroyed and the immediate circumstances in this regard were more than disastrous. In a certain perspective, this is how things were seen. *.QED.* We stop here with the first considerations regarding Mihail Manoilescu's book “The Vienna Dictate”, and we will return.

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6. Also in this part (I) of our article, on the excellent work of Mihail Manoilescu “The Vienna Dictate” Memoirs, July-August 1940, Paul Editions, 2020, we reproduce from the volume the two letters between Adolf Hitler and King Carol II, July 1940: when Germany was living its heyday of power and domination of much of Europe, of its dictatorship here. Chancellor Hitler exposes his false, historical, but also unhistorical arguments, “advising” Romania under direct threat to accept territorial concessions to Hungary and Bulgaria. And Carol II - the letter is, as the author of the book tells us, written in its entirety – conception and writing - by Mihail Manoilescu; so it's his. Some passages were written in German so that the official translator should not make mistakes, signed by Rex - it avoids challenges, it offers strictly and firmly

opposable Romanian and European arguments as clear, substantiated, pertinent as possible.

Among them, even, arguments of the German minority. It is certain, he has a diplomatic, polite tone, so as not to anger the Nazi moloh, who already had the promises made, the games made. Aiming, to a large extent, to treat, discuss and strengthen. In a few days, the German tone - and the Italian tone - changed completely, undoubtedly supporting the strong, infatuated Hungarians, sitting in positions of strength, embarrassing in fact. Romania is immediately called last to Vienna, you can see that it has to support its arguments, to negotiate. The government accepts and Manoilescu and Valer Pop go there. Terrible lies. It was not about any negotiations, explanations, mentioned delegations - the country in fact - was put in front of the document of the Dictate which, taking the painful and tragic approval from the country, from the King, had to be signed. As I said, they were saved then, in front of the Nazi, Italian, Hungarian crushing roller, the national State, the army, the institutions, the school, the church, etc. In fact, something of the Romanian soul, the other part remaining in Transylvania, immediately occupied by the Hungarians, who rushed with crimes and humiliations of all kinds against the natives. But here are the letters (see Hitler's letter first) ...

Hitler's letter

*"the Führer's Headquarters, July 15, 1940
To his Majesty, the King, - Bucharest*

YOUR MAJESTY

The events, as well as some meetings and discussions about them, allow me only today to take a position on the issues that Your Majesty has addressed to me. I ask you to admit the extraordinary situation and its dangers as an explanation for the fact that I express my thoughts quite frankly. I also informed the Duke about this letter.

To solve the problems that worry Your Majesty and the whole of Romania, there are two possibilities:

1) A tactical way, namely to seek to save oneself, by a skillful adaptation of every moment to the situation, which can be saved and

2) *The path of a main decision, the search for a final solution, even with the risk of sacrifices.*

As for the first way, Your Majesty, I cannot express my opinion. Personally, I have always been the man of the main decisions all my life and I only expect decisive successes from them. Any attempt to control the dangers that threaten your country through a tactical maneuver, of whatever nature, must and will fail. The end, sooner or later - maybe even in the shortest time - can mean the destruction of Romania.

In my opinion, all that remains is the consequence of the second way. I do not deny the external and internal political difficulties that need to be overcome. I imagine that in this way we can achieve, at least for the future, first a lasting peace and second, a growing improvement in the situation of all partners.

The second way, the only one I can propose to Your Majesty, is a loyal agreement with Hungary and Bulgaria. I call both states, because I would consider it a fatal sophistry to believe that by granting concessions to one, we would separate the two states, and thus we could more easily cope with the second. In this way, Your Majesty, you could gain at most a short time. However, it is quite clear that this would only result in a new tension and that, at the first opportunity, a new crisis would result immediately. This opportunity will not be missed, but it will inevitably appear in the shortest time precisely by postponing such a solution.

As for the purely legal side, I do not want to comment. It seems decisive to me to consider the "political power" side of the problem. After the World War, Romania acquired territories from three states, favored by a special luck, which, in my opinion, it is not able to keep for a long time due to the lack of political force. It would last only if it succeeded in harmonizing the interests of these lands from an ethnic and political point of view, or if the military weakness of the neighboring states remained permanent. The first failed, and the second we cannot expect, the laws of evolution of peoples being known. If Romania is today forced to cede acquired lands by way of concessions, then there is now a fact which, according to all human provisions, should have taken place once. It seems to me a great gain - as I think I can see - that Hungary does not insist on a purely legal definition of its claims, that it is ready to negotiate through a fair compromise.

I allow myself to communicate to Your Majesty very briefly the attitude

of Germany in this matter:

The German Empire has no territorial interests east of the German-Russian, Slovakian-German border, as well as the German-Hungarian, German-Yugoslav and German-Italian borders. Its political interests, outside these borders, find their fulfillment, mainly, in the realization of a friendly collaboration in all fields with the peoples who coexist there. So are German economic interests. Therefore, Germany has no territorial interests in Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria. It has friends, from which, its friendship with Hungary and Bulgaria has long existed and has been cultivated.

Romania's offer of a friendly attitude towards Germany for the future will of course be welcomed by Germany, especially since, unfortunately - as it is clear from the documents found - the attitude of at least the Romanian official politics, in the past and until recently, was little friendly to the Reich, on the contrary, even hostile. The reasons are incomprehensible to me, as there could be perceptible political moments. The final consequences of this attitude were even worse for Romania than for Germany. If, however, Germany has a sincere desire to contribute, in some way, to the maintenance of peace in all these territories, then it is primarily due to an explicable economic interest. However, I also unequivocally explained the following to the Hungarian government:

If the possibility of a peaceful agreement between Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria were not realized, then it would be possible for Germany to declare a total disinterest on its part in the future evolution of events in Southeast Europe.

Germany is strong enough to be able to defend its own interests immediately from any attack. But I will not allow the German army to be used for purposes that have nothing to do with the sacrifices of a war. If Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria consider that they cannot understand each other, then, according to my conviction, such an attitude will not reward any of the three states, but will punish them. In this case, I do not feel called for such an evolution to fall into my arms. The military situation of the Reich has developed so favorably that we feel it will be necessary - although this would of course be linked to sacrifices - to be able to give up the delivery of oil. As we have pointed out, we would be taking this upon ourselves as a sacrifice, yet it would be a lesser sacrifice than mixing the Reich into conflicts, which are born only because the other partners could not succeed in reaching a right agreement instead of passions and feelings. Any just reason must lead to the recognition

that a revision cannot be avoided indefinitely, and that it will be to its advantage the sooner it is done. Only when a wise settlement of the open issues between Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria will take place will it make sense for Germany to clarify the possibility of closer cooperation and to take on wider obligations in these conditions.

If Your Majesty believes that he is now in a position to revise the Romanian point of view in this regard, and would be inclined to communicate it to me, I would immediately notify Mussolini and inform the Hungarian and Bulgarian governments of this.

But if Your Majesty believes that he cannot adhere to this succession of my ideas, I will not make use of them, but I will communicate only to the Hungarian and Bulgarian governments, respectively, that the German government, as far as it is concerned, sees no way out to dedicate itself to solving the present problem.

But if such an introduction could be found to lead to a satisfactory agreement between the three states, then it would mean more to the happiness and future of the three partners than any supposed current tactical success, which sooner or later, however, it will only have to lead to new crises.

Your Majesty's Devoted A. Hitler”

... “When he read this letter, Mihail Manoilescu writes, the king's first reaction was an uncontrollable rage. So many generations of princes and sovereigns stirred in him personal pride and social pride, deeply offended by the nouveau-riche Caesar from the throne of Germany.

At the same time, no matter how bad my opinion might have been about him, I think he also suffered deeply from Romanian pride, seeing how his country is so despised that it can be spoken to in this way.

Therefore, his first decision was that he would not answer anything personally to Hitler, but without breaking the commitments to deal with the Hungarians and the Bulgarians, which he had previously made.

I didn't want to contradict him violently from the first moment. Because humanly I felt sorry for his pain, which was mine, and because I knew that after all, he is an influential and good man, as he was so easily influenced in evil, and that I will be able to decide him at last for a reasonable solution. Not answering Hitler at all was the most reckless and foolish of solutions. In international relations, State leaders never represent themselves only, and do not have the

right to make irritated gestures as in conflicts in clubs. They must think only of the dangers they can bring to their people by displaced precipitation.

And then, Hitler's letter contained characterizations and accusations brought against Great Romania, which, for the dignity of the country, had to be rebuked and rejected. The Sovereign of the country could not admit that Great Romania was formed only while being favored by a "special luck" and that it failed "to harmonize the interests of the new lands from an ethnic and political point of view".

Finally, insulting Hitler by leaving him unanswered, simply meant that he would unleash Romania's destruction that I speak of so ritually in his letter. That is why I composed a substantive answer from the king, in Romanian, to which I interspersed, for the future translator, some passages written directly in German and I went with him to the Palace to text it to Urdăreanu, because he was learning what I wanted to know, which is the gate through which one can easily reach the king's victory for a certain idea! Urdăreanu told me, politely but resolutely, that he also thought that no answer should be given to Hitler. Then he took my manuscript and walked over to another room in the Palace to ... shave, while I worked out the ministry papers while waiting for the audience hearing. After half an hour, Urdăreanu returned completely transformed, telling me that he completely changed his mind, because such a wise and full of dignity answer would not diminish him, but would make the king superior".

The answer letter of King Carol II

"To his Excellence, Sir Adolf Hitler

Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, July 26, 1940

EXCELLENCE,

I read Your Excellency's letter with very contradictory feelings.

On the one hand, I am very pleasantly impressed by the sincerity with which Your Excellency has exposed his views to me and by the detailed and clear nature of this presentation. On the other hand, the prospects that open up for My country, through the suggestions that are made to me, seem quite cloudy to me.

As you will see in the following lines, my response, as well as my entire

attitude, calls for a superhuman effort to reconcile the conceptions of Your Excellency and the feelings and interests of my people on the other hand.

Your Excellency knows better than anyone that nothing can be built sustainably on agreements that would not have the full support of the people, namely not only of the people, as they are composed and represented in a single period of history, but also of all the generations-to-come and who - in the endless ages - have the right to have their say and to judge.

That is why I believe that Your Excellency will endeavor to understand all the moments of spiritual order which come into consideration when, as Sovereign of my people, I must speak on such serious matters and will on the one hand, appreciate the need for everything that would be built in these circumstances to be only acceptable to popular sentiment and able to withstand the critique of history, for otherwise we would all risk doing a fleeting and futile work.

Before reaching the heart of my answer, I think it is necessary to point out, not without a certain bitterness, the passage in Your Excellency's letter in which you consider that the attitude of Romanian politics towards the Reich appeared a little friendly and even hostile.

I believe that through this statement, which I do not want to discuss now in depth and in its entirety, a great injustice is done to Romania. Of course, there will come a time, which I hope, when all these elements of history and all the misunderstandings of the past will be clarified and then Your Excellency will review his recently expressed opinion.

Considering that this is not the time for this discussion, I just want to express the fact that I reserve the right to an honest clarification of this issue that belongs to the past and I only emphasize that if it were only the huge deliveries of materials that have been made before and during the war, in Romania for the German Reich - of which petroleum products played a decisive role - it would still be enough for such an absolute judgment not to be expressed to the detriment of Romania.

I am also obliged and in debt as Sovereign of my country and as heir of my father, who ruled for 7 years over United Romania, to protest against the statement that Romania has failed to balance the new lands from a national and political point of view, especially since it was known that the accession of all the united provinces to the old kingdom of Romania in 1918 was a completely free and spontaneous adhesion and that from then on, the action of soul

integration of all provinces continued in a way as fast on, therefore naturally.

Unlike other new States, Romania - which is an old State - continued in its new form to achieve a real unity of soul without dissent, without particularism and special tendencies of a dangerous and centrifugal nature between the provinces.

As proof that this corresponds to the truth, witness is the fact that the national minorities within the borders of Romania, such as the German popular community, have made known so many times, freely, their satisfaction with the living conditions that they had freely in Romania, a fact that was attested even by the words that Your Excellency addressed to the official representatives of our state.

Thus, it is easy to understand that, if a minority popular community, such as the German one, could feel satisfied and emotionally attached to the Romanian State - in contrast to what happens under other neighboring dominations - it is all the more assumed that the Romanians of ancient origin were able to reach, in spirit and politics, that solidarity which in its reality cannot be disputed.

Moreover, not only national solidarity but also social solidarity were cultivated and developed in Romania through the grandiose reform of peasant ownership, which was carried out without taking into account their ethnic origin, ownership that is found in, in stark contrast to the backward class selfishness of the ruling classes in some neighboring countries, which is a true anticipation of the socialist and nationalist spirit of our time, of which we can be proud.

The problem that Your Excellency formulates as the solution indicated as preferable, can be discussed from two points of view: a) from the point of view of opportunity and b) that of actuality.

Seen first from the second point of view, I would ask Your Excellency to consider what a painful emotional moment it contains in resolving now the problem of our disputes with Hungary and Bulgaria.

Romania finds itself soon after the painful sacrifice it had to make by ceding to Soviet Russia the right to military occupy Bessarabia, northern Bucovina and even a corner of old Moldavia, namely the Old Kingdom of Carol I. The sacrifice is great not only in itself but also in the way it was consumed, as we were put in the situation of ceding without struggle these absolutely Romanian provinces both through their entire past and the Romanian ethnic

character of the vast majority of their population.

At this surrender, which deeply shook the soul of our people, we were advised by Your Excellency himself and we followed this advice:

The day after, our people received such a blow - a day when I, as Sovereign, and my people must make every effort to maintain the order inside, so difficult to maintain when the soul springs of a people are compressed to the ground, a new problem is posed to us which opens up the prospects of new concessions to our other neighbors, who, both in number and power, are inferior to us.

No matter how great the wisdom of our people may be, and no matter how great my personal desire to collaborate - at the cost of sacrifices - in achieving a higher political order in the European East, I cannot yet deny that to impose to Romania, at the moment, new sacrifices, bluntly could lead to the disturbance of the internal situation, as a result of which it would rush to take advantage of its strongest neighbors and less likely to be controlled.

That is why I am determined to express my opinion that, any political agreement that should be made, and that could lead to the shaking of the internal situation in Romania, could endanger my country and would create precisely that danger that Your Excellency wants to remove when it recommends Romania to reach an agreement with its neighbours, Hungary and Bulgaria.

That is why I could but only accept such agreements and solutions that would not lead to the total shaking of the Romanian state today and this represents not only an egocentric Romanian point of view, but even a European one.

I mention that one of the means by which the blow that the Romanian people should receive by announcing these new perspectives of sacrifices would be that the settlement of the misunderstandings mentioned above be done simultaneously with all those intentions. Laws that are in perspective in Eastern Europe and that are meant, in the state conception of the Axis Powers, to achieve a fairer balance and more lasting time in this part of the world.

I would not be able to emphasize enough the importance of this point of view and I would not be able to emphasize enough the danger that the very special regulation of the Romanian misunderstandings could present for peace, immediately after the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina.

I do not believe that our state and our people can be considered as the only predestined political entities to make continuous sacrifices on the altar of peace and for the establishment of the superior political order that Germany

pursues. Such a procedure would certainly give all our neighbors the unfortunate impression that Romania is a country ready to give in to anyone.

This means that instead of engaging in unlimited and unjust concessions, my people - and I say this with all sincerity and without any thought of overestimation and arrogance - would prefer a war in which we would not even consider possible chances.

Your Excellency could not believe that a people that has shown its worth and political solidarity over so many centuries and especially since the current dynasty took over the leadership of its destinies, could be presented to the world today, through certain processes that apply to him and to him alone, as the most resilient people.

With soul wisdom - and wisdom only - with the consideration of all political motives and whose political force dominates the current situation of Romania, I still have my duty to state categorically that there are limits whose overcoming I, in solidarity with my people, could never allow.

If I stipulate this statement, it is also because I am fully convinced that Your Excellency's sense of justice does not allow to offend the Romanian people through a treatment that seems different from those applied to other peoples, but only considers a reconstruction in which, in the end, each people would find its own balance without losing its dignity.

In conclusion, I would like to summarize my point of view and that of my government in the following points:

I. Between the two possibilities presented in Your Excellency's letter of July 15, I am of the opinion that only the second possibility could be considered. This second possibility - which has been expressly recommended by Your Excellency - should be linked to the hope that results from the formulation of the following points.

II. An essential premise for the prospects of success of this step that we would take in the direction shown by this possibility would be that the negotiations that Romania would carry out with its neighbors be undertaken at the same time by other states from south-eastern Europe which have to deal with similar misunderstandings of greater or lesser importance.

III. In dealing with this issue, neither the legal point of view, nor the exclusive point of view of force politics must prevail, but the point of view of justice for each people in particular should be decisive.

In this sense, Romania cannot deviate, for a moment, from the ethnic

principle, a principle that can be largely satisfied by the exchange of population, which should be carried out systematically and compulsory, in order to reduce or even to completely remove the susceptibility to the problem of national minorities.

IV. In order not to deviate from these principles and to obtain a fair solution to the complex of problems that separate Romania from the two neighboring countries, Hungary and Bulgaria, it is absolutely necessary to be able to rely, not on the arbitration of the Axis Powers that we do not ask, but on their lasting influence, so that during the negotiations, the once established principles are not violated.

Were we not sure that we could count on this influence, which should facilitate our negotiations, we would never start them, because we are so unconvinced by the moderation of our neighbours.

V. We cannot conceive that the sacrifices that Romania brings - even by the very fact that it admits such negotiations - will have no other result than to alleviate, only momentarily, the tension between our country and the two neighboring states mentioned above.

For us, these sacrifices must lead not only to a lasting peace and good neighbourly relations, but also to a new political order for which Germany's ample obligations could not be lacking.

VI. As follows from Your Excellency's letter itself, which speaks of the possibility that in certain circumstances Germany may be willing to take over some broad obligations, both I and my Government are of the opinion that the purpose of this whole procedure - in case we reach an agreement with these neighbours of ours - would be that we can enjoy a sincere political cooperation with Germany and the guarantees of Germany against any possibility and any attempt to eradicate our territory, where ever it would come from.

Only in this way, we believe, one could work for the happiness and future of the three states, as is clear from the end of Your Excellency's letter.

VII. One moment that seems essential to us is that during the negotiations with our neighbours - which we have no interest in prolonging - we should be left alone and undisturbed, not only, of course, by Hungary and Bulgaria, but from all other places where a danger could threaten us. It would be more than absurd if the possible atmosphere of indisposition, which it would provoke in our stronger neighbours, precisely these negotiations, which will be conducted at the suggestion of Your Excellency, would result in worrying

and dangerous situations for our country.

VIII. In order to meet the thoughts expressed by Your Excellency, I have already appointed the respective proxies to bring me the first information on the conception of the Hungarian and Bulgarian governments, respectively, in the issues dealt with here.

I add that the addressees of this letter, the President of my Council of Ministers and my Minister of Foreign Affairs are instructed to give Your Excellency any further explanations that Your Excellency deems necessary about this letter and the consequences that may result from it.

I take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my most perfect consideration and my special appreciation.

CAROL R.”

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7. We also record the epilogue to the entire material. Here it is: “As in a melodrama of old-fashioned taste, but full of upright consequences, all those guilty of the mutilation of Transylvania received a terrible punishment. Hitler collapsed under the ruins of the Reich, Mussolini was shot like a fugitive on the side of the road, Ribbentrop ended up on gallows, Ciano on a pole, under bullets ordered by his children's grandfather, Teleky committed suicide when the Germans found him betraying them, Csaky died in strange conditions two months after the disastrous arbitration, and Bardossy, the Hungarian minister in Bucharest, who later became Prime Minister, was executed in 1946.” In our country, the iron-guardists executed the longest possible imprisonment, under the dictatorship of Carol II, Antonescu and then the communists; until about 1964. Marshal Antonescu, an irreconcilable opponent of the surrender of Transylvania but, nevertheless, Hitler's military ally, was executed by the Soviets and Communists. Tătărescu spent many years in detention. Only Carol II and Mrs. Lupescu escaped the bullet and prison - as always happens to kings -; after Carol's pathetic episode, that of deserting from the army during the First World War, he had another chance he passed well - together with the mentioned girlfriend, lying on the floor of the wagon - the iron-guardist fire in the train from Timișoara to Jimbolia. With a lot of money, they then travelled the world. Fabulous moments and journeys!

Stalin, who stole Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina from us, but,

towards the end of the war, recognized and supported Romania's inalienable rights for Transylvania (the bourgeois Manoilescu, already ostracized by the communists, wrote in 1947 when he was working on the book: "... the fact that only thanks to the USSR I regained Transylvania - of course, considering the history and reality of Romania, USA, Great Britain, France etc. also expressed themselves in this way - and that in this way the trace of a fatal act was erased ... it makes me keep a totally personal feeling of sympathy for the USSR). He died, feared by his subordinates but mourned by a large part of the people (he was the symbol of USSR's victory in the war), in his bed. Nevertheless, the Northern territorial raptures were paid for with heavy torments, with hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dead, with a lot of Romanian blood that weighs heavily in the balance. Let's see what the future holds for us ... And the author of the book we are referring to, the great professor Mihail Manoilescu, nationalized, expropriated to live by selling his house belongings after years of being left without a job, expelled from the Bucharest Polytechnic, was also arrested, by the communists, on December 19, 1948, ending his days in the prison in Sighet, in a harsh detention, two years later, on December 30, 1950. The fateful gift, the December of Mihail Manoilescu and his family. This is how we commemorate it, now ... Romania has always had to sail between Scylla and Caribda. However, Transylvania was, is and will remain Romanian. As it was and is natural. "Our Transylvania has a spell on it", Professor Mihail Manoilescu wrote at the end of his volume. Great attention to the vile gestures, to what happens to them, to what blows receive from history those who want to get their hands on it.

(II)

8. A brief preface to the second part of the article. Left without allies - without guarantees - from the Western powers - Britain and especially France were no longer in a position to respect them. In a military and political landscape really dominated by Great Germany and (falsely; it will prove this in Greece etc.) by Italy, Romania will pursue, since 1938, as close a rapprochement with Germany and so it will fall into the trap of the Führer, who needed Romania anyway, especially oil, but also cereals, as well as an army to fulfill its own interests. Hitler will stimulate the Soviets, Germany's "friends", to nap Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. It will massively support the Hungarians -

and will discourage Romania in its natural reactions - to take a good part of Transylvania inhabited especially by Romanians. And it will support the Bulgarians to become masters in the Cadrilater... Brought to the helm of the country two days before the departure of King Carol II, after a short intermezzo of alliance with the iron-guardists whom he then removed, General and then Marshal Ion Antonescu has a clear inclination to believe the German leader. He allies himself, however, with him - who had planned and carried out the great misfortunes of Romania at that time - in a life and death war against the USSR: "The Holy War against Bolshevism (the Crusade)", as Ion Antonescu had called it. Hoping that he would thus regain, through fighting, Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, he even regained them until the declared "crusade" began to lose ground and roll on the slide of catastrophic defeats, hoping to regain Transylvania. However, there were only vague promises of Hitler, an ally as closely tied with Horthy's Hungary and then Szalasi's. This is exactly what Hitler's filth was: you have a friend, an ally, whom you strangle in favour of others. An ally you get a lot from. But which you do not let go: you control him, you enslave him, even more, dragging him with you through endless Russia. And if he, the ally, has any reaction, you say you want him destroyed, exterminated, knocked down. (A parenthesis: I think it would be interesting for our historiography to give more, even in detail, the advice of those Romanian generals who opposed Antonescu to go further than the Dniester, by even resigning when he crossed the Romanian army over the great river. They considered that such a campaign was not necessary. What did they have to say? I end the parenthesis).

There are projects that collapsed once with the collapse – predictable ever since 1940, see diplomat Gisevius - of Germany. However, one question remains, among other things: why the "Holy War against Bolshevism" for Romania, when the great Western powers that had a much heavier past with Bolshevism - the military interventions of 1918-1922, the harsh dispute of communism of their great colonial empires, the utter dispute of their capitalist system: "rotting", "dying", "on the brink", often openly declaring the imminent imperative of the fall of their imperialism, etc. Or all these powers, Britain and the United States, even France, as much of it there was anymore, were in a close alliance now with the Bolshevik USSR, which had wished them to perish. Instead of destroying the "Empire of Evil", as the great Western rulers later called it, they allied themselves with it, with praise, being eloquent and totally

unexpected, against its economic strength, against its social-human morals, against the patriotism and heroism of the people there. And the anti-communist flag was carried by poor Romania, neighbouring a very large part of its border with USSR, and which was a much timider capitalism, far from having the “rot” of that of Great Britain, the USA etc., former, tried and tested enemies of the Russians. This is how history is written, but in this framework not even a shred of logic can be seen ...

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9. I don't blame Antonescu. I wasn't there, I didn't live in those circumstances. I haven't studied them enough. I'm just a “retired” intendant (001), my knowledge of military tactics and strategy is limited. But I also trust others. Probably, more than likely, he had no other possibility to save Romania from dissolution and hoping for its reunification, rather than for the alliance with Germany. But let's ask - if we could, as, in fact, we cannot – the hundreds of thousands of Romanian soldiers who died in terrible conditions in the huge snows, the cursed frosts, the swampy sands, the hot fields, in the endless territories of Russia. The prisoners who suffered terribly. Are they of the same opinion – certainly, this is about crossing the Dniester - especially when for the return of Transylvania, stolen from Romania, Stalin was the first and clearly “to apply” for, in a political space that Churchill and Roosevelt gave him for management? And then?... ... Among the thousands and thousands of pages of memoirs of some soldiers - it is true, there are others who claim the opposite - those written by Captain Dumitru Păsat are suggestive, published relatively recently in Humanitas Publishing House. They are the thoughts of a Romanian officer - he was not the only one, on the contrary - who was clear in his views. An officer who fell into the poor, miserable prisonership at Don's Bend and who was consuming the terrible evil of this stage: I was thinking, what did I and everyone like me on the battle fields have to do with such torments? What did I have to do with Hitler, Mussolini, Antonescu and Stalin and with their wretched politics? What was I looking for in this desert of the Russian plain? What was I, and all like me, to gain from this massacre? ...”, “What are we doing here, Păsat, whom and what are we fighting for? It will be a pity for our heads, either we will die and our bones will remain through these deserts, or we will fall prisoners and we will die of hunger ...”. These are questions and thoughts of

Captain Păsat, a brave and sincere fighter, who cannot be answered like in school, in the arithmetic class. Unfortunately. But they are worth reflecting on. Politics also means inspiration, courage, standing on the side of justice. Such realities, the mentioned questions and the possible answers emerge anyway from Mihail Manoilescu's volume. We've talked about it before. Transylvania's rapt is seen in such a nebulous key ... There were turbulent, gloomy times. A devastating world war in progress and announcing new shocking situations. Among other things, Europe was disintegrating not at all slowly. They were fanatical heads of state and fanatic politicians, versatile, unscrupulous, pursuing world domination at all costs. Death in every way possible and "impossible" to opponents of one kind or another. And the facts unfolded accordingly ...

And yet, in the same sense. August 1940. End of summer in Vienna, the splendid capital of German Austria. Traditionally, the famous European center. In Vienna, at the siege of which, in 1683, by the Turks, in about the same months, August-September, the Wallachian ruler Șerban Cantacuzino, the publisher of the Romanian Bible, risking his life in defense of Christianity, risking also the lives of himself and others, had given to the Ottoman besiegers gun shells filled with straw, contributing to their humiliating defeat. The road to central and western Europe had once again been closed to the Turks by a Romanian contribution. In the same delicate and welcoming Vienna, therefore, the place of a painful Romanian tragedy could now be seen. As it had been initially established under specific conditions, several political leaders, heads of state, were to negotiate and treat our national territory. On the one hand, a former painter, not without talent but a wash-out, former corporal in the German army, a fanatic revanchist, racist and bloody dictator, ferocious, but who reached the top of power through democratic elections. A former Italian socialist teacher and journalist, European promoter of fascism, a strong apologist for the "rebirth" of the Roman Empire on several continents, with a mobile facies often bordering ridicule in his pompous speeches. Watching "from the shadows", a Russian gruzin, intelligent and cunning alike, become a revolutionary by profession, with his clothes stained with the blood of his numerous victims, consistent with the satisfaction of Russia's great strategic interests. Their representatives in Vienna were some wine merchant without much culture, sticky and ambitious, a relatively young slicked Italian and a seducer like Rudolf Valentino, as a politician being the product of his marriage. Both tricksters. From the "shadow", a very good Soviet Bolshevik party official,

always attentive, ready for orders and very condescending to the leader. Then a few Hungarian aristocrat-politicians, Horthy, Csaki, Bardossy, as if from another world, ambitious by profession.

On the other hand, Romania with a king rather boastful and “interested in money” for him, a man of culture and, at the same time, a Maecenas of the national culture, skillful, thinking and acting in an enemy world. An industrialist, realistic and intelligent Prime Minister, with performances, respecting his country, A great Foreign Minister, a real authority of universal economic science, recognized even then and in time, with a perfect knowledge of present and future world politics. Then, a great and wise Transylvanian, graduate and doctor in Law at the University of Cluj, lawyer with lawsuits, fighter in the Legion of Romanian Volunteers in Italy, first president of the General Association of United Romanians (1929-1937), a valuable man of culture and several times appreciated Romanian minister. If it weren't for the Teutonic boot, trotting noisily and victoriously over more than half of Europe and seeking to control what was left of it, it is obvious that Romania would have won the “negotiations”. Having its forefathers and ancestors on its side, history, truth, its great blood sacrifices over time, its wisdom and “always” its political balance. Instead, being lied to, “without any negotiation, without talks” for which Romania had in fact been invited to Vienna, the others dictated what and how to do. A “Dictat” which, on the scale, always testing the probabilities of time, did not last even five years. About how long the “great Nazi empire” lasted ... As it appears from Mihail Manoilescu’s volume, *The Dictat*, without any historical, ethnic basis, the abduction of a part of Transylvania, were a Nazi work generated by the political and military interests of Hitler’s Germany and Horthy’s Hungary etc. It was, therefore, natural for the Dictat to be annulled, to disappear with the ruin of criminal and anti-human, racist, exterminating Nazism. Condemned in time by all national and international courts, by a whole history of the world.

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10. Returning, however, directly to what was written by our former Foreign Minister in the second part of his work “*The Vienna Dictat. Memoirs. July-August 1940*”, Paul Editions, Mihail Manoilescu examines in detail the stages

that preceded the disastrous act of August 30, 1940. Respectively the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations in Tr. Severin. In short, what was called the “Transylvanian Consultation”. The two Crown Councils before and after the acceptance of the Dictat - Iuliu Maniu, several liberals and other politicians did not participate, as they did not agree with the “adjourning” of the parties during the dictatorship of King Carol II (single party) and did not want to have relations with him. At the same time, the former minister analyses the consequences of the Dictat. What happened when accepting the Dictat and what could have happened if we had rejected the Dictat. As it was seen in those days, in a Europe dominated by Germany, Italy (false, as I said), Russia, the perspectives of Romania and how or not they came true later. These are original approaches, unique until then, but also many years later, of a researcher who, as we have shown, had a thorough knowledge of the economic and political history of Europe, of the world, who had confronted, in his works, the present so harsh, the future, as it was seen, and who took into account both hypostases of the war that had become, to a large extent, already world-wide in 1940: the victory of the Axis but also the victory of the Allies, then Britain and France already having on their necks the Nazi boot. How did Romanian politicians position themselves in this way? What can we briefly mention about the conclusions of a specialist, not only political, who only had, in any way, objective views?

“Our government was aware, Manoilescu pointed out in his volume, of the need not to take decisions on the issue of Transylvania without consulting the Transylvanians and, therefore, he kept them informed either individually, as in the case of Maniu and Bălan, Metropolitan of Transylvania, whom I informed regularly and directly, either in small but representative assemblies ... (Thus, A/N) on August 2, a vast meeting of Transylvanian leaders took place at Gigurtu's house. The following were for the refusal of negotiations and resistance, with a purely sentimental motivation: Niculescu, the Metropolitan united with Rome, Vlad, Augustin Pop and Vitican. The following were for postponement (as if the postponement depended on us): Bălan, Lugoșianu, Băciu. The following did not specify their opinion on the negotiations: Horia Sima and Silviu Dragomir. Finally, the following accepted the principle of the negotiations making different recommendations: Vaida-Voievod, Sextil Pușcariu, Valer Pop, Lupaș, Iuliu Hațieganu, Bornemisa, Savu”. Here are, briefly, several points of view expressed by Manoilescu: Vlad: “the Transylvanian people do not admit any surrender, which, moreover, would be

temporary, because the basis of the Union of 1918 was the will of the Transylvanians in Alba Iulia, and not the Romanian army”. Metropolitan Bălan “recommended that we solve the Bulgarian issue, in order to better serve the cause of Transylvania ...”. Valer Pop: “... if the Hungarians ask a lot, let's refuse them everything ...”. Lupaș: “...recommended that we arrange with Bulgaria at all costs so that we can resist in the north and mobilize politically in our favor the Saxons and the Swabians, who do not want to pass on the Hungarian side ...”. Bornemisa: “... instead of being devoured, it is better to go ... with the Axis” etc. Vaida also said: “as a general rule of politics” ... “I prefer to avoid the massacre rather than get the extermination of the Romanians in a disastrous war ...” He strongly and humorously denied that Maniu and he would think about the autonomy of Transylvania ... etc.

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11. ... On August 16 and August 19, 1940, respectively, discussions began, imposed by Germany, in Tr. Severin and Craiova, respectively, on the totally unjustified and embarrassing claims of Hungary on a large part of Transylvania and, in the capital of Oltenia, on the claims of Bulgaria, which are remarkable especially for their insistence on the Cadrilater. Romania did not even want to consider such negotiations, but, as Manoilescu writes, “we were again threatened by Germany with the launch of a Hungarian and Bulgarian attack against us (including the attack of German troops, but also of Russian troops, A/N) if the negotiations will drag”... In the beautiful building “Bibicescu” from Tr. Severin, the Hungarians were from the beginning more than firm: “they consider a difficult sacrifice any piece of Transylvania's territory that they do not claim” “...The difference between Hungarians and us, Manoilescu writes, was that the Hungarians put the compromise first, namely, the idea of a new border concretely drawn and then the population exchange (Romanians being sent to Romania and Hungarians, living in Romania, to Hungary, A/N) while for us (in front of the Hungarian claims, A/N), the aim was the exchange of population and a possible territorial correction would have had no other reason than to provide the necessary living space to the Hungarian farmers expelled from Romania.... Therefore, the population exchange accepted by the Hungarian government also dominates the territorial issues, in the sense that the latter must logically be placed only according to the issues of population exchange.” In their

position of not taking any step back, “the Hungarians made a crazy claim to return to Hungary all of Transylvania, north of Mureş, including Arad, leaving us Blaj, Mediaş and Sighişoara and passing to the Hungarians Alba Iulia and Braşov.” The claimed territory included “... 2,200,000 pure Romanians”. Such fantasies could not be accepted. Our government was determined. The native Transylvanian, the great politician Valer Pop, who led the negotiations at Tr. Severin for Romania, will show, in this sense, on August 19, 1940: “I fully maintain the point of view stated (by the Government of Romania, A/N) in the aide-memoire of August 16. The Romanian royal government has nothing to withdraw or add”. It was again a firm Romanian response to the reckless Hungarian claims.

... There were other discussions at Tr. Severin, on various issues, noted mainly by the aberrant demands and the Hungarian cynicism regarding the territorial restitutions in Transylvania. On our side, “the negotiations were conducted as best we could by Valer Pop helped by his collaborators” as M. Manoilescu writes. And he also shows: “We did not give up anything, remaining until the end on our original land. We did not recognize anyone's rights over our territory - which was not established by the Treaty of Trianon, A/N - and we did not put Transylvania to division ... We did not make any offer and we did not accept any request for a square kilometer of the national territory ... In summary, as long as we treated relatively freely, we did not give up anything and we did not consent to any alteration of the country ...”. In Craiova, depending on the specifics of the Cadrilater issue, the problems have advanced ...

On August 23, 1940, the former Foreign Minister states, “Following our method of always consulting the leaders of the country on the decisions to be taken, we suggested the king the convening of a Crown Council, which included, in addition to the members of the government, all councilors as well. The negotiators from Tr. Severin and Craiova also took part”. Regarding Transylvania, the same author quotes, as well as the “Hungarian insolence”, “Vaida-Voievod began by warmly thanking Gigurtu, me and our delegates, for the dignity with which we defended the interests of the country. He urged us to sacrifice the Cadrilater, accompanying the surrender by a total and obligatory exchange of population, so that no more Romanians remain in Bulgaria and no more Bulgarians in Romania. His advice to hasten the conclusion with Bulgaria was motivated by a plastic formula, very characteristic of his oratory: “The Cadrilater is the little finger. Beyond it, we find the arm””.

Nicolae Iorga, among others, pointed out: "... the Hungarians claim that the Treaty of Trianon no longer exists, but there is its price: the dead in our war ...". Metropolitan Bălan: "... Let us be categorical towards the Hungarians who, in fact, I don't think will receive the principle of population exchange, let's strengthen the army, let's raise the spirit, let's sharpen our swords ...". Valer Pop formulated on paper, written very clearly, the instructions given by the Crown Council to our first delegate to Tr. Severin: "To obtain in advance, and as a sine-qua-non condition from the Hungarians, the acceptance of the principle after which a total and obligatory population exchange was to take place between the two countries ... Only after the recognition of this principle would be obtained, and it was decided that no change of border could take place until after the effective relocation of Hungarian minorities to the western border, to move to the second part of the negotiations and to calculate the total number of Hungarians in Romania (who were to be evacuated) and after that, the area strictly necessary for the existence of Hungarian land workers, the border region where the relocation would take place ...". Such conclusions and opinions "were unanimously approved by the king, Mihail Manoilescu concludes. And the economist also says: "... the influence that the Saxons from Transylvania naturally had was used, obtaining from them ... an active contest, which was also shown by a continuous action and by interventions in certain difficult moments ...". In the same sense, an important fact, mentioned several times by Mihail Manoilescu in the volume in question, is that the representatives of the Saxon population from Transylvania wanted to stay in Romania, they supported the Romanian points of view; at one point it was even a question of Hans Otto Roth (his grandfather's nephew, born in Mediaș and living in Germany, I had the pleasure of having as PhD thesis candidate, unfortunately dying of a galloping cancer before completion) to be in the Gigurtu government, however, being "advised" by the German legation not to take the oath. Significant for the positive evocation of all Romanian ideas and not of the Hungarian ones of that time.

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12. ... Several Romanian meetings with Fabricius took place in Vienna beforehand, an aide-memoire regarding the failure of the negotiations from Tr.

Severin and others. Proving, Manoilescu writes, that we have completely preserved the previously established line, at Berchtesgaden and Rome, and that the Hungarians are the ones who derogated from it. Hungary has made “simply huge territorial demands with no ethnic justification”. On the other hand, Csaki met in Budapest with the ambassadors of Italy and Germany (August 26) and informed them that “Hungary is determined to start the war”. It was understood what war and by whom Hungary was actually supported militarily, respectively by Germany, USSR, Bulgaria, Italy. However, Mihail Manoilescu writes, Germany had not yet openly declared, resolutely, that Romania and Hungary, not understanding each other until then, must “unconditionally submit to the arbitration of Germany and Italy”.

However, on August 27, 1940, the German legation in Bucharest sent the following note, written by Manoilescu: “Please immediately invite the Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Reich government to a conversation on Hungarian-Romanian affairs with the Reich government and the Italian government represented by Count Ciano, for Thursday, at noon (August 29) in Vienna. It would be recommended that the Minister of Foreign Affairs receive full powers for negotiations on the Romanian-Hungarian relations”. In conclusion, an invitation “for a conversation”, Manoilescu says, “only for one with the Reich government and the Italian government, so not with the Hungarians, which excluded, once again, the notion of arbitration. Then, only negotiations and not conclusions, in other words, the discussion on certain points, subject to their approval by the Romanian government”. And Manoilescu concludes: “I leave the diplomat and the historian to properly qualify the procedure used by the Germans and Italians to attract us under false pretences to a meeting that would turn into a race”. Inviting a man to your house for a purpose and, then, put his revolver to his head to ask him not only for something else, but to claim something you swore, in all its forms, for two months, and until the eve that you do not intend it at all! “What is this called, when, as Mihail Manoilescu continues in his volume, in Vienna on August 29-30, 1940, completely different things happened than the Germans had firmly promised? Why, in just 2 days - I think that earlier, and not only then, - has such a perspective changed and what happened in Vienna? We will be able to follow Mihail Manoilescu's considerations very clearly.

(III)

13. The meeting in Vienna on August 29-30, 1940 of the Romanian representatives Mihail Manoilescu and Valer Pop with Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy and with Hungarian leaders is part of the series of ploys - terrible lies with which Hitler, Nazism tried for years to govern - and even governed - Europe and the world. I say it together with Romanian and foreign researchers. Had the facts not been so serious, so sad, so dramatic, with such disastrous consequences, such utterly reprehensible, they would have been just hilarious. Certainly, for clear-headed people. But therefore, under the severe threat of occupation, of the devastating war ... Here are a few milestones: June 30-July 2, 1934 – “Night of the Long Knives”, or the killing of many of Hitler's political opponents; March 7, 1936 - Remilitarization of the Rhineland, Germany taking open steps toward an armed Rhineland that he had not yet displayed; March 1938 - The Anschluss, the incorporation of Austria into Germany, with all the “circus” played to the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg; September 30, 1938 - integration of Sudetenland, without talks with Czechoslovakia - the famous Munich Agreement, followed by the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia; August 1939 - the false attack by the “Poles” of the German radio station Gleiwitz, practically the pretext for starting the German war with Poland and for starting the Second World War, etc. The list could continue. Anyway, France “Kaput”, Belgium as well, the Baltic countries almost German etc. It was Romania's turn, Romania with kings from the German family but an enemy of Germany in the First World War and who, in the German opinion, had to “pay” for many issues. Romania's turn, invited to Vienna “for negotiations and talks” when, in fact, there it was put in front of an unannounced “Arbitration - German-Italian Dictat”, in the issue of Transylvania, the Romanian ancestral province. Mihail Manoilescu depicts in detail in his volume those terrible, tragic moments for the two Romanian representatives, but also for the whole country, for us. It is the totally bad meaning of the relatively sentimental verses: “Letters that were not sent/ By a hand that did not write them...”.



14...Convinced therefore that there is no question of “arbitration” in Romanian matters, not at all announced, and an idea that “I fought with the most

determined energy”, the great economist writes, “we left (Mihail Manoilescu and Valer Pop, A/N) in the afternoon of August 28 in Vienna. I took... General Dragalina as a military expert and other officers, and as an ethnographic and statistical expert Dr. Sabin Manuilă, the director of Statistics, with an entire staff and with all the material of maps and documents. Certainly, before the departure, the king, Gigurtu and the government were very fully informed... We were all of the same faith that in Vienna a step forward would be taken in terms of relations with the Hungarians and that negotiations with them would enter, after the intervention of the two Foreign Ministers of the Axis, into a new phase. I was sure that I would return from Vienna with full information on the Axis’ intentions and that we would be able to re-examine the matter in a new Crown Council to see what needs to be done... “. “Manuilă’s latest calculations showed that if we had to move absolutely all Hungarians from Romania to the western border, we would need to detach a territory of about 10,000 km² from Romania, and if only the rural Hungarians had moved, 7,000 km² would have been needed...”. Instead, the Romanians from Hungary were also coming, we add, and these supposed areas diminished accordingly. “But all these calculations, Manoilescu points out, were for internal use and they never came to form the basis of a proposal or an acceptance on our part with foreigners”.

...In Vienna, arrived at 1 p.m. (August 29, A/N), the Romanians were officially expected at the station by Minister Ribbentrop. After leading them to the hotel, under the generally rather cordial greetings of the crowd, Manoilescu writes that “I talked to Romalo (our minister in Germany), who had arrived from Berlin at the time, and to Bossy (our minister in Italy, A/N) who came deliberately from Rome. Their information was not very complete, and (they) did not even remotely suspect what a terrible step we were to take in a few hours... At 2 o'clock I was settled an appointment with Ribbentrop. To my surprise, Ciano was in the same room...”. After several discussions about our ambassador to Moscow, Gafencu, Manoilescu also points out in his book, “Ribbentrop moved on to the main issue and simply proposed to me that, since I had not reached any agreement with the Hungarians, the best thing is to do an arbitration there in Vienna, an arbitration that, in fact, we did not request (???) and which should take place the very next day”... “I answered, first vigorously denying that we had ever asked for arbitration, neither I nor the Prime Minister, and under no circumstances would we have asked for arbitration and especially we would not be able to accept arbitration. Moreover, the Führer (previously, A/N) declared

himself, before us, categorically against an arbitration and expected only a free agreement between the two parties. Why are they totally changing now what they had decided? And what are the reasons that would now determine the need for a quick decision?"

And Ribbentrop responded by "showing in impressively emphasized terms that the danger awaits Romania if it does not receive arbitration because they would no longer be able to control the Hungarians who once again stopped at the time of the occupation of Bessarabia by the Russians, thanks only to German pressure. Now they could no longer put any pressure on the Hungarians (!) who would go to war the next day. Russia would follow them immediately, even being in connivance with the Hungarians." And Manoilescu also writes what Ribbentrop also told him: "The result would be the end of Romania, the destruction of Romania. The words *the destruction of Romania* appeared several times during the conversation..."

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15. Resuming the narration of the talks, the Romanian Foreign Minister mentions, "they reach their climax. Ciano also asked for the floor... if Romania did not accept the arbitration, it would create huge difficulties for the Axis powers in a very difficult situation for them. This would justify the Axis powers to consider that, by refusing arbitration, Romania has sided with the Axis enemies!". "What would be hidden under this threat," continues Manoilescu, "we can understand very clearly - and Fabricius made it clear to me, in a communication made at Valer Pop's hotel - if we are at war with the Hungarians, then - since we have refused the arbitration and the Hungarians accepted it - Germany and Italy will be on the side of the Hungarians", they also attacking. Ciano, speaking on behalf of the Duke, addressed Ribbentrop and asked him to confirm this decision of the Axis. Ribbentrop, just as solemn and sharp, said he was authorized by the Führer to make the same statement: "If we do not receive the arbitration, they will consider us enemies of the Axis".

So, Ribbentrop, Ciano and others, on behalf of the Führer and Mussolini: dishonest, lying, cynical politicians. From the tone "you and the Hungarians shall see, shall discuss", a radical change of the tone to "you either do as we want, the arbitration in this case, or damn you". I apologize for the non-academic word, but that's exactly what happened. Of course, lies and cynicism in

politics are, whether or not we want to admit it, often present, but within limits - most often - somewhat reasonable. This time, however, it was a total change of considerations, of orientation, which went beyond any power of understanding as much as it would have been desirable, any imagination. But the line of German and Italian wickedness will not stop at the imposition, under penalty of country disappearance, of the so-called arbitration, and will go on. What did it contain? What kind of "correct" judgment had Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy made about Romanian Transylvania, a judgment meant to alter Hungary's increasingly relentless territorial thirst?

"...Representation", so bad for Romania, will continue. Manoilescu writes: "Ribbentrop's impression that he is under Hungarian pressure and his belief that the Hungarian army will not wait and attack us are worth nothing. I replied that if the Hungarians are impatient, I ask him to believe that our army is also eager to fight the Hungarians. But Ribbentrop immediately replied that we Romanians will never fight (only, A/N) with the Hungarians, but with many others (an explanation that will be related to what he said at the beginning), namely that the Hungarians are seconded by the Russians and that they, the Germans and the Italians, will help them". It was clear. "I left there dismayed, Manoilescu writes, with the feeling that the two powerful countries, which then held the fate of Europe, were not willing to change their relentless decision at all"... "Everything appears as a play written beforehand, in which not a single word and not a single gesture can change" "...Valer Pop, Romalo, Bossy, Crutzescu, General Dragalina, Mătăsaru and the other collaborators were waiting for me in my living room. They were all tense, worried. I came in with the words: "It's awful, we are being asked for an arbitration that we have to accept until tonight and which calls into question a cession between 25,000 and 65,000 km². If we do not accept it, it will be the end of Romania. They told me clearly"".

There were sinister hours following that not only Manoilescu and Valer Pop, but no one in the Romanian delegation, the leadership in Bucharest, those in Transylvania, the entire Romanian people will ever forget. Neither they, nor those who will come after them can forget. Such great miscreants, notorious criminals, with mega crimes against humanity as the rulers of Germany and Italy, etc. of the time, with a cursed end, seldom encountered even in the criminal history of the world, cannot be ignored by anybody...Bucharest was contacted, but with difficulty, several telegrams were also sent with difficulty. Valer Pop, Romania's second delegate, a man of admirable intelligence and courage,

also had a meeting with Ribbentrop and Ciano. Manoilescu also writes: “I know the Transylvanian psychology and I know that no matter how much love you would have for Transylvania, as I had, and no matter how many soul adhesions you would have managed to ensure among the Transylvanians, the fact of being from Oltenia is an indelible inferiority in front of them. “So, I was happy with Valer Pop 's intervention...”. Nothing was achieved, however. The same imperative uttered out loud: “accept our arbitration as it will be formulated!” “Failure to accept the arbitration will represent the total destruction of the Romanian state!””.

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16. In such circumstances, the night was hell. “Despite my mood, I was especially concerned all night about the great battle I thought I would face the next day in front of the arbitrators”. “I agreed with Valer Pop and we both shared the matter, deciding that (in front of the arbitrators, if the arbitration will be accepted from Bucharest, A/N),each of us will talk for 15-20 minutes, I will deal with the general problem of Transylvania and present the western lands from an ethnic and economic point of view and Valer Pop will present especially the historical aspect of our rights, both in the whole of Transylvania, and especially in the western lands”. Statistics, maps, calculations, sound considerations. The delegation was preparing for the eventuality of accepting the arbitration. “Finally, at 4 o'clock at night (August 30, 1940, A/N) Manoilescu shows, with a delay of 20 minutes over the last term granted by the Germans and Italians, by the two arbitrators in fact, we were notified (from Bucharest, A/N) the acceptance of the arbitration... I note that our response, in this regard, was purely verbal and that in the arbitration file there is no request for arbitration and not even a statement of acceptance of the arbitration from us”. A first crack, but procedural. A fissure that, in fact, in my opinion as a researcher, nullifies what followed. We will see that there will be others. But what did such “poor” details matter to Hitler and acolytes? Nothing. In fact, our “arbitrators” had as arguments, as Manoilescu writes, that Ribbentrop told him, that during those days, in all European capitals, they were thinking of Romania “that it is torn as a state and that he (Ribbentrop, A/N) will inevitably escape us from this fate if we accept arbitration. He seemed to say that it would be a surprise in the world

that Romania were saved and that it would continue its existence as a state". It had come this far with terrible pressure. But that was not all.



17. The morning of August 30 was also infernal, Manoilescu tells us. "It was the visits of Ghigi and Fabricius (ambassadors to Bucharest of Italy and Germany, A/N) who brought me the final draft of the letters of guarantee (of Germany and Italy, under the conditions of arbitration, for the new borders of Romania, now guaranteed by the two powers of the Axis, A/N). But when they came a second time, around 11:30, I understood, from their figure, that the solution was terrible for us. I now felt like a man waiting to be taken to the scaffold and praying in his mind that it ended faster"; and so it was. At 1:30, Manoilescu and Valer Pop, as well as the others in the delegation, were taken by Fabricius, along with the documents, statistics and ethnographic maps that the delegation considered should have been presented to the arbitrators, and taken by car to Belvedere Palace. Sentinels and the honor company, drumming... The arbitration room was a round lounge, a round table in the middle. "In front of us, Manoilescu wrote, Ribbentrop and Ciano with their suite in which we saw, standing, Clodius. With a serious and cold gesture, we were shown our seats. Everyone was silent. Everyone wanted to be solemn but for me, they were sinister". One minute later, the Hungarian delegation was introduced. "The prime minister, Teleky, a kind of teacher - high school rather than university, looking obliquely through his glasses like a Japanese man. Csaky - fat, thick, in a uniform reminiscent of the teamsters of our boyar courts..."

The arbitrators' cunning, vicious direction was done. After Ribbentrop and Ciano "I also asked for the floor, Manoilescu writes. I wanted to make the statement in the terms established by me with Valer Pop: "Please note and record in the protocol that the Romanian delegation never had the opportunity to present and develop its point of view before the arbitrary commission". All I could do was ask for the floor. Ribbentrop answered me rather briefly and brutally that I would speak at the end". The reading of the arbitration document in German and Italian did not bring anything essential. The Romanian Foreign Minister was outraged by "the two opprobrious lies" in the official text, the first that "the Romanian royal government and the Hungarian royal government addressed the Reich government and the Italian royal government, with the request

to make an arbitration” and the second that “the two foreign ministers (Ribbentrop and Ciano, A/N) took their decisions after a new conversation with ministers Manoilescu and Csaky””. They were huge lies; the Romanian cause was never thoroughly discussed.

“...On the map that was presented to us, Manoilescu showed, I watched with my own eyes the border that started from Oradea to the east, sliding under the railway line and I understood that it also included Cluj... When I looked in all its horror at the division of Transylvania, I understood that my weakened powers were leaving me completely. The picture before my eyes became blurred, like a gray-yellow cloud (then, A/N), of gray, it turned into black... At that moment I lost consciousness”. ... A glass of water. “In a minute they brought it to me. Valer Pop gave it to me to drink... I started seeing again and I had the strength to carry on my ordeal”. Then the document, read again to Manoilescu, by Valer Pop, was presented for signature... “It was my turn for my statement... Ribbentrop briefly adjourned the meeting, without giving me the floor. I didn't even have a chance to say those words, which meant not only a statement, but a protest”. The second defect of form which I have already mentioned has now arisen. In the turmoil created by Manoilescu's fainting and later, the act was not signed by the second official member of the Romanian delegation, the “plenipotentiary” Valer Pop. Which again caused its annulment: first an arbitration that had not been requested, accepted in writing by Romania, and then the lack of a signature on the respective act. Normally a null act and which would have required the resumption of the whole process... “What terrifies me, concluded Mihail Manoilescu regarding this fatal episode, is not (only, A/N) the judgment of history, but the fate that is now opening to so many Romanians which come under the rule of the Hungarians”.



18. But what did the arbitration contain, succinctly? Romania was forced to cede, to Horthy Hungary, almost half - 43,492 km² - of Transylvania territory, the tracing of the new border being personally supervised by Hitler interested in the oil region of Prahova, so that the new border reached several tens of km from it. The estimated population we lost was over 2,600,000 inhabitants, of which (see the Romanian census of 1930) almost 1,177,000 Romanians, about 912,500 Hungarians, 68,300 Germans, 138,800 Jews, 96,800 other

nationalities. The abducted region was called Northern Transylvania. Not only economically important cities, railway junctions, industries, agriculture, important trade were torn from the national economy, already stabilized by the effort of economist Mihail Manoilescu, as a unitary well-balanced whole. We had been forced by the Germans and Italians - practically by Hitler and Mussolini, but also by the Soviets - to pay with a terrible sacrifice, but in any case, preferable to crushed Romania. As Manoilescu wrote, "the country got the benefit of not falling into the greatest possible evil", the one that had seen itself as almost immediate certainty less than two months ago, on July 4, 1940. Nazi Germany - well, Horthy Hungary - was on the ridges of the Carpathians giving a much more obvious security in terms of its supervision and use of Romanian oil. And Romania paid hard with an important territory and its people. Of the country, in fact ... As a result of the negotiations with Bulgaria, carried out in Craiova, and under the conditions of the arbitration – Vienna Award, on September 7, the agreement was signed, by which the territorial cession of the Cadrilater was registered, 8,000 km² from South Dobrogea.

Let us also say that in the second meeting of the Romanian Crown Council, on the night of August 30-31, the Council also held under the high presidency of His Majesty - King Carol II, it was decided to accept what had been decided by the arbitration of Germany and Italy: 19 votes in favour, 10 against, 1 abstention. Among others, His Beatitude, Patriarch of Romania Nicodim Munteanu, royal adviser, Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, PhD royal adviser, His Eminence, Metropolitan Nicolae Bălan, royal adviser, general Gheorghe Mihail, chief of staff, Constantin I.C. (Dinu) Brătianu, Ion Mihalache, Mihail Popovici, Silviu Dragomir, Father Ion Moța, Horia Zelea Codreanu etc. took part. Emphasizing once again, with much justice and courage, that "Arbitration (or Dictat, A/N) has been accepted following the ultimatum communications made by the German and Italian governments". Manoilescu says that the authors of "this formula well-deserved merits from the future generations because they created at that very moment the basis of a moral and political revision and annihilation of the monstrous act in Vienna". Our Foreign Minister - along with Minister Valer Pop and the other delegates - will return to the country - after fainting once in Vienna - under the direct supervision of German professor Eisen Schiemeleisen, who had also taken care of Queen Mary. A heartbreaking and sinister return, Manoilescu lying all the time on the bed in the car. He could

succumb a few times. What mattered, however, compared to the immense hardships, with many deaths in torment under Hungarian bayonets, which the Romanian-born population in Northern Transylvania, stolen from Romania's body endured, suffered. As an irrefutable proof of cynicism and continual adventurism, Csaky declared himself dissatisfied and “crushed in spirit” because he had not obtained the entire territory required as the desired surface and shape. Practically, the whole of Transylvania... A fatal, Nazi act, which will be annulled in less than five years.

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19. But how does Mihail Manoilescu explain in his book the “last minute”-thinking of Germans and Italians on the issue of arbitration? Why from the apparent “advice”, “discussion”, “negotiation” and “talks” did they pass relatively abruptly - says the author, I say it was a thought, a well-prepared variant - to arbitration and to so unfavorable “decisions” for Romania, huge malicious decisions, without historical and ethnic criteria? Unfavorable to Romania, where anyway, as we have shown since 1938, Tătărescu government had begun a sensitive rapprochement with Germany, reaching an economic agreement, etc.? Here are some considerations. “The solution given by arbitration, writes the Romanian economist, Foreign Minister, is monstrous and non-viable. For the first time in history, the natural, geographical, political and historical unity that is the plateau of Transylvania is divided between two states... How could therefore the Vienna arbitrators imagine that they will be able to innovate, where geography and history have long been pronounced and how did they think they could impose on the future an artificial and hybrid solution like that of the division of Transylvania?”

On the one hand, the author points out, developing a series of details, “under certain influences - which paradoxically descended from Genoese approaches, current in the League of Nations - Goebbels cultivated the theory of “spiritualization of borders” and gave as propaganda slogan, intended to cover and to justify the monstrous Dictat, the prospect that in the future, in Europe United under the auspices of Germany, the borders between countries and nations will no longer matter much! I do not think it was a sincere conviction in the middle, but only a way to justify, with a cheap and idiotic utopian formula, an act that was not justifiable in itself. The Vienna solution - Manoilescu also

points out - is disastrous from an economic point of view, because it operated a brutal cut in a living body, crossed by an inextricable complex of veins, arteries and nerves, shattering an economic unity based on a close interdependence between each of its parts ... But above all - and this is the only aspect that our heart holds back - the solution in Vienna is extremely wrong and unjust from an ethnic point of view ... Through the Vienna Arbitration they gave in to the Hungarians - M. Manoilescu had figures from the Director of Statistics, Sabin Manuilă, we repeat them - over 43,000 km² with a total population of over 2,600,000 inhabitants, of which 1,177,000, namely, 49% Romanians, just over 910,000, namely, 38% Hungarians and 68,300, namely, 3% Germans ... What is worth emphasizing is that in The Vienna Arbitration approx. 1,200,000 Romanians were sacrificed out of a total of approx. 14,000,000 ethnic Romanians, from all over Dacia.” A longer quote, with repetitions, however necessary, but significant and which reflects a certain already acute desire of Germany - and Italy - to strike in Romania and satisfy Hungary. But were these the only reasons for the change in the attitude of Germany and Italy - of course, it mattered less...

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20. Mihail Manoilescu also points out other issues which have led to a change in the method of resolving the dispute with Hungary, with Germany moving from the promotion of free negotiations to that of a brutal and ultimate method. The “strategic solution” thus played an important role: “the renunciation of the express war against England and... the certainty - which had been accentuated during this period (July, August 1940, A/N) - of the German-Soviet war, this fact bringing to the forefront the strategic objective of the Carpathians between Transylvania and Moldavia”. “...The change in the situation of the war... had led Hitler to the conviction that he would not be able to overthrow England quickly, by a direct attack and that he would have to come, in order to strengthen his position, to the war with the USSR and the conquest of Russia”. So, as we showed, Romanian oil, Romanian cereals, the Romanian army, impossible partner against England, but more than likely partner in a war against USSR which, even on the advice and action of Germany - but who else took this into account - had napped us Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. And then, the surveillance of Romania, of its riches, I have already mentioned, was much more easily carried out directly by the Germans and Hungarians on the coasts

of the Carpathians, than on the Tisza. Who could Hitler trust more, the play-boy King Carol II, who had a hard time with a Jewish lady, Elena Lupescu, who influenced many events in the country - an unacceptable issue for Hitler's Nazi, racist Germany; Romania, the enemy of Germany in the First World War; the traditional "francophonie" of Romania - or Hungary led by Horthy, a former aide, even if earlier, of Emperor Franz Josef? Antonescu and the iron-guardists were "perfectly faithful" to Nazism, the Axis, but such fidelity also went to a point. The answer to the questions that were also Manoilescu's, the explanations given by this great man are not at all difficult to understand. Of course, given the total, total unscrupulousness of Nazi Germany. The new perspective of the German war "changed" history, ethnicities, geography, justice a lot, and then the scenario shown was conceived...

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21. Manoilescu parsimoniously analyzes what would have happened in the conditions of Romania's refusal of the Arbitration, its acceptance guiding its research on a good part of the volume. So, what if we didn't accept it? Manoilescu shows several times in view of what Hitler and Ribbentrop said: had we not accepted the decision taken by the Germans and Italians on August 30, "we would have been destroyed as a state and as a national army. All the acts of the time and all the later confessions show that if we had not accepted the Arbitration we would have reached a (short) war on three fronts, with Hungary, Bulgaria and the USSR (and with Germany, the former Romanian Foreign Minister writes elsewhere, A/N), followed by the invasion and division of the whole of Romania" "...As for the fate of Transylvania, it was normal that, in case of refusal of the Arbitration, the division of Romania would have taken place and Transylvania would have been entirely occupied by the Hungarians... The Germans would have hurried to occupy our oil region ... As for the fate of Moldova, Bessarabia and Bucovina, it is certain that Moldavia was occupied as far as the Carpathians ... The USSR could not rightly tolerate the Germans settling in Transylvania through their Hungarian vassals without Soviet troop, keeping them counter-buffer in the Moldavian Carpathians and they could not be left completely uncovered strategically, in the case of the war that would certainly break out later ... When the case of the war between Germany and the USSR came, it would have found us as a nation beheaded by its rulers, impoverished

and on its knees. For, by refusing the Vienna Arbitration, the Romanian State would have disappeared in a few days as the Polish State had disappeared...". And, in addition, the ensuing battles would have taken place - devastatingly - on our territory...

But, the economist, engineer and reserve officer Mihail Manoilescu wonders, if, in the same hypothesis of refusal, they defeated the Allies to the end, would we have had a better fate than the one we opened up by accepting the Arbitration?" Let's look at Poland", Manoilescu writes (in 1947, A/N). Although Poland is formally in the same camp as the USSR, it is now losing the eastern half of its territory! But in our country the situation would have been much worse, because we had as enemies both the Hungarians and the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs (who, as I have shown, were to enter Romania in the days of the Russian ultimatum) and the Russians, all of whom, if necessary, would have taken full advantage". And the series of demonstrations, of evocations continues, highlighting, for then, but also for now, the dramatic situation of Romania..."



We conclude here our considerations on this very remarkable, particularly complex volume. His ideas, his appreciations, are, however, much more. We have tried to address the essentials. It is the work of a great researcher, of a very special Romanian politician and patriot. He can be, through his work, an example to our present generations. Also acting in a complicated world. Not like the one from Manoilescu's time, but anyway...

And more. As Foreign Minister, Romania's special envoy to Vienna, Mihail Manoilescu signed the Arbitration. He had repeatedly warned us to reject this act if the army could fight with chances. A no was said. But Manoilescu did not sign the Arbitration act alone. The cursed document, through the approach communicated to Manoilescu in Vienna and the order to sign it, was previously signed by the king, by the Prime Minister Ion Gigurtu, by the Crown Council, by high prelates, by army generals, etc. The drama of Mihail Manoilescu's life, from then on, August 30, 1940, until his death in torment, in prison, in Sighet, in December 1950, arrested in December 1948 as a bourgeois politician, was that he placed his Romanian signature on this dirty and fatal act. This signature will remain in the eternity of his people. Once again, it didn't depend on him.

But Manoilescu had a conscience, that is why he kept being tormented, and so he will remain, forever. Today, among those who, for example, have destroyed our national industry and transformed us - with or without a signature - from producers to branded European importers, dramatically sealing the lives of future generations through a huge external debt. Of those who thus contributed essentially to the destruction of a middle class, difficult to reconstitute, how many have it? In relation to Mihail Manoilescu, the most important supporter of Romania's industrialization? But also, in relation to other important industrialists such as D.P. Marțian, Al. D. Xenopol, P.S. Aurelian, Laszlo Kövály, George Barițiu, I.N. Angelescu, Ștefan Zeletin, Nicolae Malaxa, Vintilă Brătianu, Max Auschnit, Mitiță Constantinescu, or, on another level, Ion Crișan, C. Caloianu, A. Rosen, P. Protopopescu, I. Atanasiu, A. Vijoli, R. Winter, Virgil Actarian, Așot Șarafian, Em. Dobrescu and many others? Almost no one. A harsh alarm signal for the present and perspective... And now a kind of “arbitration”, otherwise, in other conditions, accepted, often even embraced, but with a resonance in time not infrequently at all positive. We are not interested in the perspective of the autarchic economy; we do not want it. But, especially, from the angle of some industrial, production connections, more efficient with the economy, the European industry of other countries.

A/N The underlinings in the text belong to Mihail Manoilescu.